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COMMENTS
THE "CLEAR AND PRESENT DANGER" TEST AS APPLIED TO SEXUALLY
ORIENTED FILMS-SOME PITFALLS
Chemline, Inc. v. City of Grand Prairie, 364 F.2d 721 (5th Cir. 1966)
It is felt by many that the existing Supreme Court obscenity standards
do not provide adequately for regulation of certain materials considered
harmful to children.1 This concern over the protection of children is usually
based on the theory that rising juvenile delinquency and declining moral
standards are in some way caused by the dissemination of objectionable
matter to minors. In Chemline, Inc. v. City of Grand Prairie,2 the Fifth
Circuit ruled, in effect, that films which are not obscene under Supreme
Court standards' can be suppressed on the ground that they create a "clear
and present danger" of causing psychological harm to child viewers. Al-
though the court could have relied upon the facts before it, as evidence of
socially undesirable conduct actually resulting from showing the films, it
chose not to do so. Instead, the court held that, as a general proposition,
showing films containing nude sequences threatens psychological harm to
children sufficient to constitute a clear and present danger justifying legisla-
tive suppression.
The plaintiffs in Chemline, operators of a drive-in theater, presented
"art films" depicting nude or semi-nude women. Although the audience
was restricted to persons over eighteen, adolescents frequently watched the
1. See, e.g., People v. Kahan, 15 N.Y.2d 311, 312, 258 N.Y.S.2d 391, 392 (1965)
(per curiam) (Fuld, J., concurring); State v. Settle, 90 R.I. 195, 198, 156 A.2d 921,
924 (1959); Comment, Exclusion of Children From Violent Movies, 67 COLUM. L.
Rzv. 1149 (1967); Note, Constitutional Problems in Obscenity Legislation Protecting
Children, 54 GEO. L.J. 1379 (1966); Note, The Youth-Obscenity Problem-A Pro-
posal, 52 Ky. L.J. 429 (1964).
2. 364 F.2d 721 (5th Cir. 1966).
3. In Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957) the Supreme Court sought to
take the plethora of existing rules on obscenity and reform them into a standard defi-
nition. The Roth test is whether "to the average person, applying contemporary com-
munity standards, the dominant theme of the material taken as a whole appeals to
prurient interest." Id. at 489. In addition, the Court established a "social value"
test, under which a form of expression is protected by the First Amendment if it can
be considered to have the slightest value to society. Id. at 484. The first significant
refinement of these standards occurred in Manual Enterprises, Inc. v. Day, 370 U.S.
478, 482-83 (1961), in which the "patent offensiveness" test was added to the Roth
definition. Material is patently offensive if it affronts contemporary standards of de-
cency relating to the description or representation of sexual matters. In 1964 the
Court, in Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184 (1964), re-examined and re-affirmed the
validity of the Roth standards. Jacobellis did change the "contemporary community"
standard into a "contemporary national" one. Id. at 195.
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films from outside theater property. Certain morals offenses, including
public masturbation and the rape of a fourteen year-old girl, occurred in
areas adjoining the theater while the movies were being shown. There was
also evidence that parking violations and traffic accidents in the area in-
creased. The city council reacted by passing an ordinance regulating theater
operation. One of its provisions prohibited the exhibition of films showing
the nude or semi-nude female body on screens visible from public streets.4
The plaintiffs brought an action in the Federal District Court to enjoin en-
forcement of the ordinance, challenging this provision as a violation of
their right to free speech. Although the city argued that the provision was
a constitutional exercise of its police power to curb a clear and present
danger to the community's morals and safety,' the District Court, in an
unreported opinion, enjoined enforcement of it. On appeal, the Fifth Cir-
cuit held the ordinance to be constitutional in its entirety.' Although the
provision restricting exhibition of films containing nude sequences did not
itself indicate an intent to protect children, the court ruled that the ordin-
ance was a valid means of preventing exhibition to children of films that
might create a clear and present danger of psychological harm to them.7
There are at least two other grounds which the Chemline court might
have used to uphold the challenged ordinance without relying on the broad
proposition that any film portraying nudism may be suppressed as creating
a clear and present psychological danger to child viewers. It is arguable
that the clear and present danger test could have been legitimately applied
on the basis of the particular facts before the Chemline court. The plain-
tiffs' films were probably responsible for the traffic problems' and the morals
4. It shall be unlawful for any licensee, ticket seller, ticket taker, usher, motion
picture machine operator and any other person connected with or employed by
any licensee to show or exhibit at a theater in the City or to aid or assist in such
exhibition any motion picture, slide, or other exhibit which is visible from any
public street or highway in which the bare buttocks or the bare female breasts
of the human body are shown or in which striptease, burlesque or nudist-type
scenes constitute the main or primary material of such movie, slide or exhibit.
Grand Prairie, Tex., Ordinance 1621, Paragraph VIII (1966).
5. The city conceded that the plaintiffs' films could not necessarily be subjected to
censorship under the Supreme Court's obscenity standards. Chemline, Inc. v. City of
Grand Prairie, 364 F.2d 721, 724 (5th Cir. 1966).
6. Chemline, Inc. v. City of Grand Prairie, 364 F.2d 721 (5th Cir. 1966).
7. Several related issues were raised by the court, the most significant being the
problem of prior restraints on free expression. See Times Film Corp. v. City of Chicago,
365 U.S. 43 (1961); Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697 (1931). Issues of secondary
importance included the power of a municipality to tax communication under the First
Amendment, and the possible pre-emption of local by state law in the regulation of
motion pictures. These issues, like the principal one, were determined in favor of the
City.
8. See Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940); State v. Brown, 240 S.C.
357, 126 S.E.2d 1 (1962).
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offenses in the vicinity of the theater. An application of the clear and pres-
ent danger test to these particular facts might be acceptable, if there is a
causal connection between the movies and the socially undesirable conduct.
However, it is apparent that the Chemline court requires no proof of causa-
tion in applying the clear and present danger test, because there is no avail-
able evidence that psychological harm to child viewers is caused by films
portraying nudism." The Supreme Court has ruled that the clear and
present danger test is not applicable to obscenity," and application of the
test, presuming causation can be shown, would be limited to material not
denied the protection of the First Amendment under existing obscenity
standards.
The court also might have upheld the ordinance on the theory that a
special standard of obscenity can be applied to legislation designed to pro-
tect youth." The so-called "variable obscenity" approach would reqiure
a court to determine whether the material is obscene to children under
existing community obscenity standards. In Jacobellis v. Ohio,'2 Justice
Brennan recognized the "legitimate. .. interest of States and localities ...
in preventing the dissemination of materials deemed harmful to children."'"
9. See Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 508 (1957) (dissenting opinion of
Justice Douglas); State v. Jackson, 224 Ore. 337, 359, 356 P.2d 495, 505 (1960);
B. KARPMAN, THE SEXUAL OFFENDER AND His OFFENSES: ETIOLOGY, PATHOLOGY,
PSYCHODYNAMICS, AND TREATMENT (1954); N. ST. JOHN-STEVAS, OBSCENITY AND
THE LAW 196 (1956); ABA-ALI DRAFTING AN OBSCENITY STATUTE (Paulsen ed.
1961); Cairns, Paul & Wishner, Sex Censorship: The Assumptions of Anti-Obscenity
Laws and the Empirical Evidence, 46 MINN. L. R!v. 1009 (1962); Green, Obscenity,
Censorship, and Juvenile Delinquency, 14 U. TORONTO L.J. 229 (1962); Henkin,
Morals and the Constitution: The Sin of Obscenity, 63 COLUM. L. Rv. 391 (1963);
Kalven, The Metaphysics of the Law of Obscenity, 1960 SUPREME COURT REV. 1. But
See Gaylin, Book Review, 77 YALE L.J. 579 (1968).
Some state legislatures have apparently sought to solve the problem by fiat:
It is declared that the publication, sale and distribution to minors of comic
books devoted to crime, sex, horror, terror, brutality and violence . . .are a con-
tributing factor to juvenile crime, a basic factor in impairing the ethical and moral
development of our youth and a clear and present danger to the people of the
state ....
N.Y. PEN. LAW § 484-e (McKinney Supp. 1966); Act of April 19, 1956, ch. 3686,
[1956] R.I. Public Acts & Resolves 219.
10. Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957).
11. See Dibbles, Obscenity: A State Quarantine to Protect Children, 39 S. CAL. L.
Rav. 345 (1966); Note, Constitutional Problems in Obscenity Legislation Protecting
Children, supra note 1; Note, The Youth Obscenity Problem-A Proposal, supra note 1;
Comment, Exclusion of Children From Violent Movies, supra note 1.
12. 378 U.S. 184 (1964).
13. Id. at 195. The validity of the variable obscenity doctrine is soon to be con-
sidered by the Supreme Court. Interstate Circuit, Inc. v. City of Dallas, 366 F.2d 590
(5th Cir. 1966), petition for cert. filed, 36 U.S.L.W. 3010 (U.S. Jan. 13, 1967) (Nos.
971, 978, 1966-67 Term; renumbered Nos. 42, 44, 1967-68 Term); Ginsberg v. New
York (N.Y. Sup. Ct. App. Term, 2d Dept. 1966), appeal docketed, 36 U.S.L.W. 3010
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While the variable obscenity approach would have avoided the causation
problem, it would have left the courts with the problem of determining
community standards at a second level and deciding ultimately, if not in
the present case, whether a redeeming social value limitation ought to be
applied in the case of material found obscene for children."4 However, the
court based its decision on neither the known harm nor the variable ob-
scenity concept, but without proof of a causal connection based its clear and
present danger argument on the supposed psychological harm to child
viewers.
The clear and present danger test was originally developed by Justice
Holmes in Schenck v. United States"5 as a test of the constitutional legiti-
macy of restraints on expression. The test is whether "the words used are
used in such circumstances and are of such a nature as to create a clear
and present danger that they will bring about the substantive evils that [the
legislature] has a right to prevent."'" In Dennis v. United States" a
"balancing test" was articulated as a corollary to the Schenck clear and
present danger test. This corollary requires the court to determine whether
the gravity and probability of the evils threatened by speech in each in-
stance outweigh the value of freedom of expression.
The Chemline decision creates two traps for the unwary which will be
encountered in an effort to apply the clear and present danger doctrine and,
more particularly, its balancing test corollary in obscenity cases. First,
the balancing test distracts attention from the need to establish that a causal
relation actually exists. Second, if a balancing test is adopted, for material
not claimed to be obscene under the Roth test but only harmful to children,
the issue will almost invariably be resolved in favor of censorship.
In Chemline the existence of a causal relation between the plaintiffs'
films and the psychological harm which allegedly results from children
viewing them was not established as a fact and probably could not have
(U.S. Feb. 1, 1967) (No. 1022, 1966-67 Term; renumbered No. 47, 1967-68 Term);
United Artists Corp. v. City of Dallas, 402 S.W.2d 770 (Tex. Civ. App. 1966), appeal
docketed, 36 U.S.L.W. 3011 (U.S. Mar. 3, 1967) (Nos. 1109, 1155, 1966-67 Term;
renumbered Nos. 56, 64, 1967-68 Term).
14. A Book Named "John Cleland's Memoirs of a Woman of Pleasure" v. Massa-
chusetts, 383 U.S. 413 (1966).
15. 249 U.S. 47 (1919).
16. Id. at 52.
17. 341 U.S. 494 (1951). The test as enunciated in Dennis was "whether the
gravity of the 'evil,' discounted by its improbability, justifies such invasion of free
speech as is necessary to avoid the danger." Id. at 510, quoting the opinion of Judge
Learned Hand in Dennis v. United States, 183 F.2d 201, 212 (2d Cir. 1950). The
force of the Dennis ruling is qualified by the fact that Chief Justice Vinson spoke on
behalf of only four justices in his plurality opinion.
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been. In trying to establish a clear and present danger of psychological
harm, a court would face the dual problem of determining what the psy-
chological harm is, and of establishing a causal relationship between
viewing the movies and the harm. Defects in present sociological and psy-
chological knowledge would preclude any definite conclusions regarding
either.1" Indeed, it may well have been the desire to avoid these problems
which led the Supreme Court to reject the clear and present danger test in
the area of obscenity.
It is true that the Court in Schenck did not require factual proof that the
proscribed speech caused a substantive evil. It is clear, however, that the
decision in Schenck was founded upon an assumption that a causal rela-
tionship did exist. The Court was willing to make this assumption because
it was dealing with speech which communicated "subversive ideas," speech
whose obvious purpose was to instill socially dangerous attitudes in those
who were exposed to it. 9 The Court pointed out that such speech could
only have been disseminated because it was intended to have socially dis-
ruptive consequences." The probable effect was inferred from the intent.
By contrast, obscene material, whether verbal or pictorial, does not
typically contain exhortations to engage in anti-social acts. It is deemed
objectionable not because of ideas it communicates, but because of the
nature of what it portrays. It is much more difficult to evaluate the prob-
able effects of a mere portrayal than of an idea which possesses an inherent
tendency, readily discernible to all who comprehend the idea, to motivate
action. Allowing the court to speculate as to the probable detrimental effects
of obscene portrayals would give free reign to purely subjective inclinations
of the judge, without even the assistance of inferred intent to bridge the
causal gap. In obscenity cases factual proof is the only way to close that gap.
Therefore, application of the clear and present danger test in pseudo-ob-
scenity cases would normally require factual proof that the material does
cause socially harmful results.21
The extent to which the Chemline court's use of the clear and present
danger test can undermine the protections established by the Supreme
Court in Roth and subsequent obscenity decisions is indicated by Chem-
18. See note 9 supra and accompanying text.
19. "Of course the document would not have been sent unless it had been intended
to have some effect, and we do not see what effect it could be expected to have upon
persons subject to the draft except to influence them to obstruct the carrying of it out."
Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 51 (1919).
20. Id.
21. See Katzev v. County of Los Angeles, 52 Cal. 2d 360, 367, 341 P.2d 310, 315
(1959); 48 CAL. L. Rzv. 145, 147 (1960); cf. P. FREUND, ON UNDERSTANDING THE
SuPRzmE COURT 27-28 (1951).
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line's reliance upon American Communications Association, CIO v. Douds.22
The court quotes Douds' declaration that "[w]hen the effect of a statute
... upon the exercise of First Amendment freedoms is relatively small and
the public interest to be protected is substantial, it is obvious that a rigid
test requiring a showing of imminent danger to the security of the Nation
is an absurdity."2 The quoted language embodies the "balancing test"
developed as a corollary to the clear and present danger test established in
Schenck v. United States.24 The first objection to Chemline's use of the
balancing test is that the social value of allowing free expression is to be
balanced against the state's interest in suppressing speech; but the Supreme
Court, in holding that material can be suppressed as obscene only if totally
devoid of redeeming social value, has foreclosed an approach which treats
social value as only one factor to be balanced against others.2" In addition,
if a balancing test is used to determine whether films portraying nudism may
be suppressed, the issue will almost invariably be resolved in favor of censor-
ship. The value of showing such films can be viewed as negligible in com-
parison with the value of allowing dissemination of other material, especially
that which expresses political dissent; and even the value of political dissent
was found to lie on the light end of the scale as the balance was struck in
Dennis and Douds. The value of free expression will appear particularly
slight in a case like Chemline, in which the court is called upon to apply
the balancing test not to a single film, but to a process of exposing minors
to many films at plaintiffs' theater. When the court's attention is focused
in this way, no attention is paid to the merits of any particular film, so
that a finding that there is any value in showing the film is almost neces-
sarily precluded. These considerations suggest that the balancing test is
weighted in favor of censorship when applied to the facts of the Chemline
case.
The traps hidden in the clear and present danger and balancing tests are
such that, used without proof of causation, they could open the door to gen-
eral restriction on materials not obscene under the standards of Roth and
subsequent cases.2" They could thereby be used effectively to undermine
the protections conferred by the existing Supreme Court standards of ob-
scenity.
22. 339 U.S. 382 (1950).
23. Id. at 397.
24. 249 U.S. 47 (1919).
25. A Book Named "John Cleland's Memoirs of a Woman of Pleasure" v. Massa-
chusetts, 383 U.S. 413 (1966).
26. See note 3 supra for discussion of these cases.
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